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Foreword

Sources on this period of Chilean history
are very scarce in Notth America and often
contradictory.
Consquently I have adopted
the following method of referencing: Direct
quotes from sources are cited immediately;
Souroes used to create a composite pioture
of a time period are all cited together
at the end of that period, i.e. each day;
Bibliography includes sources consulted
as well as cited; An additional bibl io 
graphy of sources known to this author,
wh ic h should be of primary importance but
were unavailable to him during this r e 
search, is included at the end.

This paper is presented in two sections;
A calendar of known facts of the "Social
ist Republic” ; and Interpretations of
those facts, primarily the Socialist
legend which has grown up around the
"Republic", as well as other viewpoints,
including this a u t h o r ’s, challenging
that legend.
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The

Setting

As dusk was falling on Santiago, Chile, that autumn
evening of June 4, 1932, three men strode forcefully into the
Moneda Palace.

There they confronted a worried President

Juan Montero and his cabinet with an ultimatum; resign turn
ing the government over to them, or, face an armed clash in
the capital city.

The President refused to resign and grace

the coup with an aura of legality.

Not having the necessary

forces to quell the revolt, Montero quietly left the Palace
allowing the insurgents to seize the reins of government.
With the assumption of power by the rebel junta, a government
and a legend were born which were to haunt Chile for the next
forty years.
This new regime came to be known in history as the
"Socialist Republic", with the legend principally centering
around the man perceived to be its leader, Colonel Marmaduke
Grove.

The three men who confronted President Montero that

evening were to be the "Republic's" principal leaders and,
among them, its executioner.
of the trio.

Grove was the expected member

The charismatic commander of the air force had

a history of revolutionary attempts and enforced exiles.
had led the insurgent troops into Santiago.

He

His friend and

trusted civilian aide, Eugenio Matte, accompanied him that
evening.

Matte's appearance was hardly startling either, as
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he was Grove's assistant and the head of a small radical
socialist group. New Public Action.

As the only socialist

leader involved in the coup, Matte became a member of the new
socialist junta.
Rounding out the trio that evening was Carlos Davila.
On the surface, he appeared an unlikely partner.

Davila was

a leading Santiago journalist and a man with an impeccable
reputation.

He had been the Ambassador to the United States

under the right-wing Ibanez military regime and had returned
from that post only a year earlier.

But Davila was not only

involved in the socialist revolt, he was the leader of the
new junta and its only member destined to stay in power more
than a fortnight.
That insurgent junta and the Grove legend have become so
entwined over the years that the period has come to be known
as "the twelve day Socialist Republic of Marmaduke Grove".
The legend has been so built-up over the years by various
leftist political factions that it has all but obscured the
historical realities of the regime.

Curiously,

the tradi

tionally history-conscious Left has conspicuously avoided
publishing any hard data on that government.

Consequently,

Grove and the "Socialist Republic" have passed into history
as the legend depicts them, unchallenged by historical research.
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To evaluate the validity of the Grove legend, it must
be put alongside the historical facts of the period.

These

facts are not widely known and are in dispute as little has
been published since shortly after the "Republic's" fall.

For

North Americans, the best sources are still the international
news reports at the time and the diplomatic dispatches to the
various countries involved with Chile during the "Republic's"
brief life.

The Chilean sources, which should be invaluable,

are lacking in this country.

Only by a compilation of the

observations of the reporters and diplomats on the scene can
a North American hope to adequately test the legend.

The Twelve Day Republic:
A Calendar
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June 4 - Saturday-

On Friday, June 3, 1932, Defense Minister Ignacio
Urratia had requested Colonel Marmaduke Grove to relinquish
his command of the Chilean Air Force.

Colonel Grove had

agreed to turn over his command upon the arrival of his
/

properly designated replacement.

Commander Ramon Vergara,

having been named Grove's successor, then had arrived at El
Basque air base shortly after midnight to assume command of
the Air Force, but upon his arrival Commander Vergara had
been arrested and imprisoned by Grove's troops.
While these activities had begun as a seemingly routine
military command change, no command change involving Grove
was ever simple.

He had twice been exiled and once discharged

from the military for his political activities and insubordin
ation.-1- His personal history of revolutionary activity was
long and varied and had prompted former President Ibanez to
comment,

"He [Grove] was born a revolutionary, as others are

born blond or brunette."2

While supposedly awaiting the

arrival of his replacement, Grove had begun marshalling his
forces for a coup.

He had secured the aid of four powerful

figures in Chilean politics and military affairs.

The insur

gent leadership was shared by Grove, General Arturo Puga,
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Commander Arturo Merino, Carlos Davila and Eugenio Matte.
After meeting far into the night, the insurgents were ready
to move against the government at the dawn of June 4.
Realizing something had gone awry in his attempts to
oust Colonel Grove, President Montero called an early morning
meeting of the leadership of all major political parties.
There he explained he was expecting a barracks revolt and
asked for their support in quelling the rebellion, should it
occur.

The leaders of all the parties, except the Liberals,

pledged their loyalties to the Montero government against any
military-imposed junta.
Early that same morning, Air Force planes took off from
El Basque and headed up to Santiago, only ten miles to the
north.

Their mission was to bomb the city with pamphlets.

The leaflets called for a new government dedicated to a
socialist and state-controlled economy.

Their message

severely criticized foreign capitalism in Chile and the
wealthy classes who assisted it in bleeding the poorer
classes.

The pamphlets also threatened to bomb the Moneda

Palace if the government did not resign so a new government
to implement their demands could be created.
When President Montero did not capitulate, Colonel
Grove marched his troops from El Basque into Santiago.

Fif-
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teen blocks from the Moneda Palace he halted,

stationed his

/

troops and waited.

As evening came, he, Davila and Matte

went to the Palace, confronted President Montero and assumed
3
power. J

Despite the pledges and programs issued in the leaflets
dropped by the planes, the junta was still unsure of its
course that evening.

Davila was named to the new junta, and

immediately became its principal spokesman, with General Puga
as its Provisional President and Matte completing the member
ship.

The country looked anxiously to Davila,

their trusted

diplomat, for some explanation of the path this new "socialist"
government was to follow.

Only a month before he had issued

a lengthy manifesto calling for state socialism.

He had

asserted that only state control of the production and dis
tribution of the country's main products, including nitrates,
could bring the country out of the depression.

His manifesto

had been premised on the assertion that Chile's condition
warranted "a trial of socialism adapted to our national
peculiarities."4

But when asked that evening about his plans,

Davila could only answer with bland assurances:

"We expect

to put into effect here an outstanding regime that will be
strong and solid, one that everyone can depend on.

I really

know little of what our program will be, except our plans for
a socialist state."5
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June 5 - Sunday

The first major act of the new junta was to unveil its
plans for the transformation of Chile into a socialist state.
That morning the junta published a manifesto
a program of immediate action

(Appendix A) and

(Appendix B ) , which quickly

produced repercussions at home and abroad.

Their major

points fell roughly into four areas of concern: political,
economic, international and

class-oriented

.^

While most of

the proposals were radical,

the document as a whole was not

very socialistic.
The political portions were the least radical.

The

junta declared itself in power, dissolved Congress and called
for a new constitution, all of which were not unheard of
actions, though unusual for the Chilean style of politics.
The most radical move was to pardon the sailors and political
prisoners involved in attempted revolutions against the
former government.

Such a move might allow more revolution

aries to assume an active role in the "revolution" and per
haps gain some support within the Navy, which had not partici
pated in the coup.
The economic portions were not at all in the tradition
of socialist programs.

Nowhere was there any mention of
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socializing the means of production.

The major economic

plans called for establishing monopolies and setting up a
Commercial House of State upon which to base a social sector
within the capitalist economy.

Socialization of credit was

the most radical program proposed.

This move would require

state control, at least, or possibly even outright destruc
tion of the present financial system.

As the financial sector

was the heart of the capitalist enterprise, both foreign and
domestic, this plan was certain to rouse resistance.
It was the international front which appeared most
ominous after the release of the manifesto.
concerning the Compania de Salitre de Chile
prime importance.7

The programs
(Cosach) were of

Cosach was the firm which controlled the

nitrate industry, the country's most important product, as
well as the source of most of her foreign investment and
exchange.

Any move towards the firm was a major policy

switch and one which would be regarded as anti-imperialistic.
The manifesto's calls to open mines outside of Cosach and
dissolve the combine were certain to meet extreme resistance
from abroad.
The class-oriented proposals gave the manifesto its
radical flavor and set the path the junta followed to gain
support.

The distribution of food and unproductive farm
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land to the unemployed, the suspension of evictions and
occupation of abandoned houses were all visible payments
\

which the masses could collect by supporting the junta.

New

tax measures against the rich were expected to add 500 million
pesos to the state treasury as well as place the new regime
firmly at the head of a mass-based movement.^
The manifesto made very clear that the upper

classes

were expected to be in opposition and the masses were to be
favored at their

expense.

^

United States Ambassador Culberson

analyzed the situation that evening in his report to Washington:
Junta for the time being has the military force
necessary to maintain its power but the properited
and conservative classes will not accept the social
istic measures proposed without resistance.
More
over, the Junta will encounter practical difficulties
at every turn in case it attempts to put in force its
radical measures.
If it should go so far as to
resort to force and confiscation we will see resis
tance and conflict.10
The success or failure of the
its ability to generate

government was to rest on

the support necessary to maintain

itself in power while attempting to implement these proposals.
An outlook for success was not shared in all quarters.

After

reading the reports of the manifesto and programs, British
Foreign Office analyst R. L. Craige wrote,
prophet,

"If I were a

I should predict a short and stormy life for this

government." H

The moral force of the legend of the "Social-
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ist Republic" rests on its attempts to realize its radical
manifesto.

June 6 - Monday

Monday morning brought back the realities of the world
to Chile.

It was the first workday under the new regime, the

banks were to open and business to resume.

However, the bank

workers called a strike which was joined by other profes
sionals to protest the new government's intentions toward
the banks.
opening.

The work interruption prevented the banks from
The junta replied by closing the banks for three

days so that they could have time to investigate the bank
problem in more detail and decide on a practical program.-*-2
If the banks did not present enough of a problem, the
courts compounded it.

The Supreme Court ordered all courts

suspended and inoperable under the junta.

Even as the

domestic resistance mounted, it was becoming clear that the
mounting international concern over plans for the nitrate
industry might eclipse all domestic concerns.

The inter

national community was clearly opposed to any nationalization
pl an .
Over the question of how to handle the international
problems the first rift appeared in the new government.
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Davila took the lead in developing a policy of moderation.
His policy statements that day contradicted both the letter
✓

and spirit of the previous day's manifesto.

Davila sent a

telegram to the "New York Times" and had an interview with
the "Times"

(London)

correspondent.

He indicated that moder

ation:/. not radicalism, was to be his guiding principle.

The

government would proceed slowly in deciding the nitrate
question.

Any plan would be implemented within the existing

recognized international monetary system.

Confiscation of

foreign currency bank accounts, as had been widely rumored,
was also dismissed as a goal.

In his telegram to the "New

York Times" Davila best explained his new policy outlook:
"Notwithstanding the socialistic atmosphere, the new govern
ment has not contemplated drastic measures far removed from
past practices of most affairs of state . . .

No changes of

importance are considered except to foster international
understanding between

s t a t e s . " ^

He indicated that within

this policy Soviet Russia would probably be recognized.
Also taking up the policy of moderation was General Puga,
the Provisional President,

Appearing more clearly now as

Davila's ally, Puga tried to create the impression that the
new government was not comprised entirely of revolutionaries
or even represented all of them.

In an interview that day,
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he stated,

". . . we do not deny the formation of revolution

ary groups to oppose us, among whom are some communistic
members.

I simply ask, Where is the government which has not

some opposition?
The statements of Puga and Davila emphasized the contra
dictions between the radical manifesto and practical reformist
politics.

Questions were being raised as to whether the

country was going to be fully socialistic or simply one with
a regulated capitalism; and whether it was to be rigid or
pliable toward international interests.

These policy questions

were the first public sign of the growing factionalism within
the junta.

Reports in diplomatic circles of the previous day

indicated Davila and Puga were pushing for moderation; Grove
and Matte for radicalism.-^

The key to the answers of these

questions was likely to be in the disposition of the Cosach
problem.^

June 7 - Tuesday

As the junta members began to feel the pressure of
rising opposition,

they began a series of programs designed

to build institutional and popular support.

At the institu

tional level, the regime announced some new plans of impor
tance.

First, they dealt with the Congress.

The legislative
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body was partially dissolved and its functions pre-empted by
the junta.

Those legislators who had been appointed during

the Ibanez dictatorship were removed.

New elections were

scheduled for November to fill those seats.

At that time

Congress, hopefully friendly to the new regime, would resume
its legislative function.
A second institutional move was the granting of amnesty
to all social and political prisoners.

These included naval

personnel who had attempted earlier in the year to topple the
government.

These men were pardoned and reinstated in the

military service, a move which would hopefully produce a
military more loyal to the junta.

This move would be opposed

b y most officers, but would be popular with the lower ranks
and serve to reduce the officers'

influence.

As the naval

officers had not supported the coup, the junta's seduction
of the lower ranks was not an unsound policy.
The junta also announced its plan to eliminate unemploy
ment within a month by the creation of new economic institu
tions.

The government would create three state companies;

one for agriculture, one for mining, and one industrial.

The

companies would hire the unemployed throughout the country as
their labor force.

The theory was that once these companies

began operating they would strengthen the government's posi-
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tion in the economic sphere.

By adding a more dynamic sector

to oppose the private sector, which was largely controlled by
the government's opponents,

the regime might be immune from

economic pressures.
The real battle for survival was going to be for the
allegiance of the people.

By their absolute passivity during

the coup, it was clear that they were not attached to the
Montero government.

However, it was equally clear that the

new military-imposed regime had not yet captured their sup
port.

British Charge^d'Affaires Thompson summarized the

situation that morning:
Revolutionary government have failed to obtain
the public support which they evidently counted upon,
given the widespread discontent in the country due to
the economic crisis.
That this support is conspicu
ous by its absence is due to the extreme violence of
methods used - aeroplanes, demonstrations and so
forth - to unpopularity of military dictatorships of
which this country has had enough for the time being
and to the unhappy wording of their first proclama
tion which has given every reason to assume that the
political views of the junta are of a deeper hue than
pink.1 "7
The questions over policies to be pursued to build popu
lar support was accenting the split in the junta.

Puga quietly

resigned as Minister of Interior, though he remained on the
junta.

The ministry had been his more powerful position as

it had given him control of the police forces.

His replace-
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ment, Rolando Merino, was more radical and a shift in the
direction of the Left was beginning.18
The government announced the first two programs of a
series of popular measures aimed at securing an alliance with
the masses.

No evictions were to be made for unpaid rent for

any dwelling renting for less than 200 pesos a month.

All

tools and clothing held as collateral in government pawn
shops were to be returned to their owners without charge.
These measures were aimed at the urban poor and working clas
ses.

The decrees could have come directly from the proclama

tions of the Paris Commune of 1871, a predecessor the junta
now seemed to be emulating.
The opposition, however, was neither dead nor withering
away.

Concern for their power was shown in three other

proclamations issued that day.

First,

firearms were confis

cated from the Civic Guards and other private organizations.
These groups were largely middle and upper class, and intent
on defending their homes and property.

Second, the Finance

Minister announced he would delay any moves to confiscate
Cosach holdings until the government could study the question
further.

The government recommendations would likely be sub

mitted to the new Congress in November, giving the interna
tional concerns sufficient time to negotiate an arrangement
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suitable to all.

Third, the government announced plans for

the reorganization of the National University, then being
administered by a board of three professors and three stu
dents.

This move was in reply to student opponents who had

seized a university building and were calling for a general
strike to overturn the new regime.
On the other side of the spectrum there was increasing
evidence of some mass movement in favor of the government.
Workers held a number of demonstrations in Santiago that
Tuesday, most of which were in support of the new junta.

One,

however, was anti-clerical and organized against nuns after
the newspaper "La Liberdad" announced the junta was consider
ing laws banning religious orders.
was in progress,

Even as the demonstration

the junta was denying any designs against

either religious orders or their property.

While the junta

was prepared to challenge the propertied classes with many
radical ideas for change, apparently it was not yet prepared
to reopen the traditional liberal - conservative schism over
the role of the Church in the

s o c i e t y .
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June 8 - Wednesday

The split in the junta over policy was daily becoming
more evident.

While Davila and Puga continued their pursuit
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of moderation, Grove and Matte attempted to make the original
program a reality.

These differences became clearer that

Wednesday as the workers of Santiago confronted the govern
ment with some genuinely radical demands.

These demands were

purported to be the price of their support.
The workingmen's societies of Santiago had called a mass
open air rally, at which many speeches were given, some radi
cal and violent in tone.

It was then decided by the leaders

at the rally to lay their demands before the junta.

The crowd

then marched down the Calle Moneda to the Palace, and once
there, demanded an audience with the junta.

It was Matte,

the only genuine socialist leader in the regime, who came to
listen to their demands.
The two most significant demands were for the regime to
give the workers the use of the Club de la Union and to arm
a "Red Army".

The Club de la Union was a private aristo

cratic social club.

The workers wanted it turned over to

them for a recreation center in the "soviet style".

More

importantly the workers wanted to form a "Republican
Socialist Guard" and have the government arm it.

The workers

would then take up arms to assist the junta in realizing its
aim of socializing the country.

No other single demand could

have struck more fear into the hearts of the military or
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conservatives than the spector of an armed, undisciplined
workers' army.

Matte listened to their demands.

Addressing

them, he told the rally that the junta was determined to
carry out its full program and do justice to the longsuffering proletariat, a view clearly not shared by all his
colleagues.

However, he made no firm commitment toward ful

fillment of the specific demands.
Other problems also had to be faced that day.

Wednesday

was the last day the banks were to be closed under Monday's
order.

The Finance Minister, Alfredo la Garique, announced

the Central Bank was being reorganized and that a council of
workers was to take over control of the Savings Banks.

He

also proposed expropriating the foreign currency accounts on
deposit in Chilean banks.
into effect that day.

None of his proposals were put

The time was approaching when these,

or some other plans, had to be agreed upon and enacted if the
banks were to open and the economy to normalize.
In another economic move the Minister of Education
announced a plan to employ 100,000 of the unemployed.

The

plan called for the founding of state corporations, in addi
tion to those proposed by the junta the previous day.

These

would be for transportation, warehousing, distribution and
purchasing.

Among their activities would be taking over con-
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trol of the rail system.

These corporations were designed to

provide the social infrastructure necessary to support the
productive corporations Davila had proposed.

Together they

could make the social sector dominant in the economy.
The junta also announced it was studying a proposal to
trade nitrates for Soviet oil.

Where this proposal origina

ted is not clear, but it was certain to set off internal as
well as international repercussions.

The junta also pro

hibited the sale of arms, ammunition and explosives.

This was

a further attempt to disarm, or at least prevent the future
arming, of the opposition'& organizations.

The junta recog

nized that if the workers were to be armed for the "Republic's"
defense, the weapons would have to come from the government
anyway, as most of the workers could not afford to adequately
arm themselves.^0

June 9 - Thursday

Thursday was the day the banking question had to be
/

decided.

Despite Davila's assurances of moderation, the

junta promulgated two radical decrees.

The Central Bank was

nationalized and renamed the "Banco Del Estado".

Its board

of governors was dissolved and a new administration was to
be appointed later by the government.

The second decree was
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of more importance to the international community.

The junta

announced all deposits of foreign currency were to be expropri
ated.

These deposits were being credited to the government

accounts.

The owners of the deposits were to be reimbursed

in pesos at the official exchange rate of June 3, the day
before the revolution.2^
The confiscation decree was certain to raise the ire of
the international community.

Not only was the peso no longer

worth what it had been on June 3, but the official rate that
day had been greatly inflated.

To stop further devaluation

of the peso, the junta enacted two additional controls.

Only

small withdrawals were allowed from banks, and these had to
be in pesos.

Strict controls were also imposed on the stock

market in an attempt to rectify the fiscal situation.
While the financial problems generally occupied most of
the junta's attention, Thursday marked its first serious step
toward socializing the economy.

The government announced

plans to take over the big sugar refinery at VifTa del Mar.
The refinery would become state-owned and run by a committee
of the state and the workers.

This was the first attempt at

internal property expropriation and the beginnings of the new
Commercial House of the State.

Such a move so soon in the

regime's existence was bound to bring a reaction from both the
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workers and the owners.
long for a reaction.

The government did not have to wait

That same day the workers at the paper

"El Mercurio" demanded the paper be turned over to them to be
run on a socialized basis by a workers' committee.22

June 10 - Friday

Banking continued to be the junta's main concern Friday.
Reactions came that day from the international community in
response to Thursday's decree.

United States Ambassador

Culberson, acting on behalf of the City National Bank of New
York, protested the order seizing foreign currency deposits.
Many of his diplomatic colleagues also submitted protests.
The government did not remain 'unmoved in the face of these
pressures.
day.

The Finance Minister met with leading bankers all

The bankers complained not only that the decrees were

unjust but also impossible to comply with and have the banks
remain functional institutions.

The Minister promised to

reconsider the decrees and issue clarifying orders soon.
The protests had an effect for the junta did not imple
ment the decrees.

Government officials privately expressed

their opinions to the diplomatic corps that the decrees would
be modified, at least toward foreign concerns, before being
put into effect.

To calm international fears the junta ad-
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vanced a more moderate proposal.

By its terms the newly

nationalized Banco Del Estado would be the central feature.
The shares of the old Central Bank owned by private citizens
or other banks would be expropriated with payment at a fair
price.

In this manner the bank would be converted into a

state organization and the investors would not be hurt.

The

state bank would then continue to serve the same function, in
the same manner, as the private bank had.

The only difference

would be its new directors and the use of some of its assets
to erect a new system of state credit banks to assist the
masses.
These proposals did allay the international fears some
what.

The only fiscal decree the junta did put into force

immediately was a new order closing shops which bought gold
or silver and then melted it for export.

In the financial

field the junta was creating the impression of "paper revolu
tionaries".

They appeared to attack the heart of capitalism,

the banking and international investment businesses.

However,

after making radical pronouncements and hearing the anguished
complaints,

the revolutionaries brought about only mild re

forms to stabilize the currency.

Nothing that the revolution

aries had effected so far was more than a nuisance to the
capitalists.

23

Lest anyone get the impression that the regime had
abandoned socialism, Davila issued a statement explaining the
overall economic program for the country.

According to him,

the government was trying to found and promote state enter
prises in all major economic sectors.

Their purpose was to

raise internal productivity, cut imports and improve the
balance of trade.

Socialism was part of this scheme.

"Private

enterprise will not be brought to an end, but a collectivist
economy will be created to supplement the existing individ
ualist economy.

The latter will be submitted to severe con

trols in order to substitute, as far as possible, the competi
tive system for a far-reaching co-operative o n e . D a v i l a ' s
message, and even his avoidance of the terms capitalism and
socialism,

sounded a note of restrained, responsible, moder/

ate state action.

Within the scope of Davila's statement,

the government announced it had plans for price controls on
foods and an iodine monopoly.

(Iodine is a by-product of

nitrate mining.)
While the junta was appearing more moderate, a challenge
arose from the leftists outside the government.

h group of

Communist students seized the National University, which was
still closed awaiting reorganization after the earlier dis
turbance.

The students seized the university press and
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printed a manifesto demanding the right to participate in the
new socialist government.

Their manifesto also demanded that

the government give the students suitable headquarters, either
the Club de la Union or the Municipal Theatre.
was important for two reasons.

First, the demonstration was

lead by Elias Lafferte, the head of the Chilean
munist Party.

The outburst

(Moscow) Com

Second, it was the first outbreak of a leftist

or working-class protest against the "Republic".

With the

demand for participation in the decision-making process, the
government was faced with a difficult political situation.
It could either co-opt the leftist groups into the government,
thus opening it to a charge of communism and possible inter
national intervention, or it could keep the other groups out
side of the government and thereby limit its already narrow
potential power base.

The junta did nothing for the moment,

neither stopping the demonstration nor moving against the
participants.

That situation could not be tolerated indefin

itely. 24
British Charge"* d 'Affaires Thompson, in analyzing the
confrontation between the Leftists and the government that
evening, saw two ways the situation could be resolved.

First,

the alliance between the military and the government could
break over the issue of radicalism.

The military would then
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revolt and pave the way for a return of a right-wing military
dictator, such as Ibanez.

Second, the radicals could consoli

date their position with the military,

the Left and the

people, remain in power and gain influence on the whole con
tinent.

This possiblility held the greater fear for the

British as it could create repercussions in other countries
where Britain had interests.

To forestall this possibility

and interject the prospect of intervention into the junta's
calculations, Thompson suggested that the Parliament and the
press issue severe warnings against nationalizing foreign
holdings.

June 11 - Saturday

Saturday was not a banking day so the junta could spend
its time confronting other problems.

Foremost was the recov

ery of the National University, still in communist hands.
Grove, as Defense Minister, went on the radio in the early
morning hours and broadcast a warning to the communists.
While this warning was dutifully reported as a serious stand
against communism, it sounded more like an inter-left polemic.
Grove's message was clear; the junta would not tolerate
any attempt by the communists to prevent the government from
realizing its previously announced socialist goals.

"We are
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disposed to continue the program as set forth without taking
into consideration anybody or anything that may endeavor to
make us break away."2^

The communists were being presented

with a choice; either support the government and obtain
socialism its way, or stay out of its path.

Should they

choose to exercise neither of these options, Grove made quite
clear his feelings when he said,

"We will use a hand of steel

in putting down Communist actions designed to create a sub
stitute for the regime as established by the junta."2^
A fact not as prominently reported about that speech was
that Grove concluded b y warning the Right that he would suffer
no interference from that quarter either.

Grove made clear

his intention to back his words by sending a committee Satur
day to take control of the University.

The communists yielded

without a struggle and no arrests or harassment of the insur
gents took place.

Despite Grove's strong words,

it was becom

ing apparent that he was willing to accept allegiances from
other Leftists willing to strive for socialism his way.

Not

all of the junta was inclined to be so liberal or friendly
with the Left.
A huge demonstration of support was held that Saturday
with an impressive international cast.

Socialist leaders

from Colombia, Ecuador and Peru came to praise the efforts of
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the junta to achieve socialism.
new programs were announced.

In that connection two more

First, a National Socialist

Economic Council was named, with some workers among its mem
bers.

Its job was to meet daily to advise the Cabinet of

economic problems and suggest courses of action for their
consideration.

Second, the Department of Labor announced that

it would begin feeding 250,000 unemployed in nine cities
twice daily.

Both programs were designed to generate worker

support and restore the junta's reputation as a friend of the
masses, after refusing the communist students' demands.
Even though banking was not the main topic of the day, it
remained a problem which simply would not go away.

The Finance

Minister issued a statement confirming the original banking
decrees.

Given the radical atmosphere of the day, he main

tained they were justified and would be put into effect.
also warned foreign banks that if they resisted,
ment would take appropriate actions.

He

the govern

His statement insured

that banking was to remain a problem during the upcoming
week.

June 12 - Sunday

Sunday could have been a quiet day for the government.
After its first full week in existence, Sunday seemed like a
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good time for t h e 1regime to rest, reflect on the distance
covered and the course yet to be travelled.
revolutionaries,

But for true

the Sabbath is- just another day, and Matte

and Grove were not in the mood to stop the revolution even
for a day.
/

That Sunday afternoon, Davila resigned from the junta.
It was probably no accident that he was strongly criticized
by the leftist paper "Opinion" that day.

"Opinion" was a

leading proponent of the movement to dissolve Gosach.

Davila

was criticized for his moderation toward the foreign inter
ests.

Grove and Matte were still seen as sticking to the

original radical program and did not come under fire from the
Left.
It had become more apparent as the week went on that the
junta and the principal leaders of the coup were not of one
mind politically.

Grove and Matte believed that great sacri

fices by the capitalistic and foreign interests were necessary
/

to socialize the country.

,

Davila, General Puga and General

Arturo Merino, now Grove's successor as Commander of the Air
Force, believed that socialism could be achieved through an
evolutionary process, within the bounds of normal govern
mental activities.

A clash between the groups was inevitable

if the regime's course was ever to be clearly defined.

So
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The government could only look toward that segment of
the people who were the weakest in terms of experience, organ
ization and resources; the workers and the poor.

Even here

the regime's support was neither uniform nor strong.

The

rural work force was under the paternalistic control of the
landlords, who remained the bastion of the opposition.

So

the government was heavily courting the urban workers, lower
middle class and the unemployed.
members of the Left.

These were the traditional

The radical press was now completely

unbridled; their papers and posters covered the city, but the
ever-present discord within the Left kept them from being a
united political force.

The regime had to know that it had a

very weak base and its continued survival depended on a very
impressive performance, very quickly.
The government announced a new vehicle for creating sup
port.

This program was designed to extend the government's

ability to communicate with and influence the masses.
commission was created to bring culture to the masses.

A new
Oper

ating on the premise that a socialist state has a duty to
advance public culture, the commission was endowed with
impressive resources.

It was to have a state-owned theater,

radio station, printing plant, art school and movie studio.
These facilities would allow the commission to disseminate
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educational and entertaining programs to increase the musical,
literary, artistic and social awareness of the people.

Should

the government strive long enough for the operations to be
come effective, the commission could also become a powerful
on

tool for creating public opinion and support. u

June 13 - Monday

Monday was the day to try to regroup the government if it
was to have any hope of survival.
changes were announced.

Two significant personnel

Rolando Merino was promoted from

Interior Minister to the junta to fill Davila's place.

Arturo

Ruiz Mufei, a Santiago municipal official, was named the new
Interior Minister.

With these moves, Grove and Matte, alone

among the original conspirators,
power.

remained in positions of

Puga remained as the Provisional President, but his

role was that of a figurehead.

Grove and Matte had now filled

all the powerful positions with radicals of their choosing.
If they wished to make a radical government,

the means were

now at their disposal.
/

Grove commented that day on Davila's resignation.

He

/

wished, he said, to put to rest the impression that Davila's
leaving was the result of another military coup.

Speaking

as the Defense Minister he gave the military view on the event:
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I wish to make a statement denying the rumors,
which are entirely untrue, about difficulties hav
ing occurred between members of the armed forces,
concerning the alleged claims of military groups
to exercise some control over the actions of the
junta governing this country.
On the contrary, it
can be declared that the army does not desire to
become mixed up in public affairs and simply wishes
to remain united in its efforts to support and pro
tect the Socialist Republic.
Grove's statement read more like a plea for the army to stay
in the barracks than a statement of solid military support for
the revised junta.
The government reorganization had international effects
since the moves were viewed as steps toward creating a more
radical government.

Washington was very disturbed as they

had great confidence in Davila, whom the government had known
from his days there as Ambassador.

The United States Ambassa

dor let his apprehensions be known by protesting the banking
decrees,

state monopolies and any other contemplated moves

against foreign interests.32

The British were extremely dis

turbed by the developments and the Chilean question was raised
in that Monday's debate in Commons.

The public warning

Thompson had requested on Friday was delivered by Mr. Eden,
Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs:
His Majesty's government has not entered into
official relations with the present government, but
his Majesty's Charge' d'Affaires has been instructed
to inform (them) that his Majesty's government takes
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a most serious view of these confiscatory measures
and, if they are carried through, will strongly
support a demand for full compensation for the
British investors affected.33
With the protests and the warning the spector of international
intervention arose.
Knowing the international feelings on the previously
announced banking decrees, the junta issued a change of policy.
The Finance Minister officially retracted the decree establi
shing the Banco Del Estado.
its former operation.

The Central Bank would return to

He also commented that nothing detri

mental to any foreign interest would be done soon.
Despite these assurances,

the Minister also brought an

ominous shadow back to light; the question of the disposition
of Cosach.

The Cosach question had been largely ignored while

the banking problems were in the forefront.

Now it appeared

that Cosach was to be the issue on which Grove wished to make
his fight.

The Minister announced that Cosach would be

expected to provide drafts for foreign exchange necessary to
continue operations.

Also Cosach would be expected to con

tinue full production during the period its future was under
consideration.

The Minister did caution the public not to

expect immediate and violent measures yet as the matter still
required much study.

The fact that the matter was under study

34

again served a clear warning to foreign concerns.34

June 14 - Tuesday

Tuesday the new junta began to mark its course more
clearly.

Senator Aurelio Nunez Morgado was appointed the new

Superintendent of Nitrate Mines.

This was a particularly

significant appointment as Senator Nunez had just been elected
to the leadership of the Radical Socialist Party in May.

That

Party was the most significant organization of the Left.

His

appointment was the junta's first move to incorporate other
leftist groups into the government coalition.

Nunez's appoint

ment to oversee the nitrate industry was particularly suitable
from the radicals' viewpoint.

A civil engineer by training,

Nunez authored his party's strong stand against Cosach;

"The

'Cosach1 shall be immediately dissolved and those chiefly
responsible for its formation shall be punished.”3^
mounting the challenge for a battle over Cosach,
nothing in the banking field.
/

While

the junta did

Apparently banking was viewed

as Davila's fight which he had lost.

The new junta would make

its stand on nitrates.
The junta announced two additional debt reforms to aid
the middle and lower classes.

The government decreed a 30-day

moratorium on all debts of retail merchants.

Furthermore,

they
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extended the loans of small businessmen through the National
Savings Banks.

These moves would hopefully relieve some of

the pressures on the small merchants allowing them to hold
current prices and not contribute to the rising inflation.
This, in turn, would aid the lower

classes.

In another reform aimed at the middle class,
announced a solution to the university problem.

the junta
Now that both

the student opponents of the regime and the Communists had
relinquished control of the buildings,

the government felt

confident enough to discontinue its earlier controls.

The

University was once more made a self-governing body.

This

practice was more in line with the Reforms of
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C o r d o b a ,

which were the standards accepted b y most of the educated
classes.

While none of these reforms were especially revolu

tionary, taken together they began to show a concerted push
to acquire support from the middle
While the new junta continued

classes.
on its way,Davila

was not

quite prepared to be totally left out of the public spotlight.
Tuesday he published an open letter to his former colleagues
and the country.

He explained his resignation simply,

The Socialist Revolution is an accomplished
fact.
It is possible that I have made mistakes.
Many times I have gone against the opinions of
most of you . . . but always I have proceeded
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with the deepest revolutionary sincerity and in a
manner foreign to all classes or groups or inter
ests or considerations which did not aim at the
same ideas which made us march together in a brief
but transcendental step in the life of the country.
My withdrawal is not a subtraction from the
revolutionary forces, but, on the contrary, an aid.
It leaves my friends free of all personalist sus
picions, so they can collaborate better to accom
plish their w o r k . 3 ^
Davila's sentiments were certainly admirable and quite
reassuring to the junta and the people.

It was obvious that

his resignation was that of a highly principled and publicspirited man, not the result of another military coup.

But

while his sentiments were above reproach, both his assurances
to stay out of the government and his "revolutionary sincer->•
ity" were suspect.

His actions had indicated that his revolu

tionary activities were confined to overthrowing the govern
ment, not to attempting a thoroughgoing revolution.

The

/

question remained:

Would Davila's revolutionary inclinations

drive him to another coup?3®

June 15 - Wednesday

Wednesday was a day when the news of Chile mostly origin
ated from foreign sources.
the "Times"

(London)

This was not unusual in light of

report on the following day that a strict

censorship of the mails and cables leaving the country had
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been imposed on Wednesday.

The domestic situation did not

seem to warrant such actions, but the international scene was
heating up.

It was learned late Tuesday that the British

government was dispatching the cruiser H.M.S. Durban to Peru.
The move, according to the Secretary of the Admiralty, was,
". . . i n order to be ready in case of need for the protec
tion of British interests in C h i l e . A p p a r e n t l y ,

Mr. Eden's

remarks to Commons Monday were not just rhetoric.
Also on the international scene Wednesday,

the French

Ambassador protested the measures which affected the French
interests in Chile.

In the United States, the Chilean Ambas

sador talked to the New York bankers,

informing them that the

Central Bank would operate as before.

His conversations were

to attempt to calm the fears of the international bankers, who
controlled enormous investments in Chile.
The only real news from within Chile that day was the
fact that the trolleys stopped running.

The railway workers,

who had become Grove's and Matte's most solid supporters,
walked off their jobs to attend rallies called in support of
the new junta.

Wednesday had all the appearances of the calm

before a storm.
The suspicion that a storm was coming was confirmed by
Ambassador Culberson in a conversation with British envoy
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Thompson, a conversation which Thompson reported to London
but Culberson left out of his report to Washington:
United States Ambassador told me today (June
15) that preparations for counter revolutionary
movement were actively progressing and he antici
pated important developments in 2 or 3 days or at
the most within a week.
He felt position of Junta
had greatly weakened. While I have no means of
confirming the above I agree with His Excellency's
further remark that much now depends upon the
morale of N.C.O.'s. who are a more or less perman
ent body but who have been for months objective of
communist propaganda.
There is much reason to
suppose their superiors are uneasily conscious
that they have been made fools of while the con
scripts are generally of such low mental calibre
that they will follow any decisive lead.4 !
If such preparations were underway and Culberson knew of them
it was reasonable to assume that Davila, who was a personal
friend of Culberson, was involved in the plot.

Many elements

were now prepared to back the moderate socialists against the
radicals.

A counter-coup lead by Davila would have a good

chance of regaining control of the government.

June 16 - Thursday

A climax of revolutionary action was reached on Thursday.
The junta got the day off to a good start.

They approved a

plan to have the state represented by six, rather than three,
members on the board of the revived Central Bank.

Further,

the junta announced it was appointing a commission to study
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the foreign currency confiscation decrees and its report was
due in a month and a half.

During those 45 days, the decrees

would be held in abeyance.

This would give everyone time to

find some livable solution to the banking problem.
Having put off the threat from the international inter}

ests, the junta turned to revolutionizing the country.

The

Health Ministry announced it was studying a new plan to soc
ialize medicine.

The plan called for the government to super

vise the whole medical field.

Free medical care would be

given to everyone, with the program financed b y an annual
fee paid b y each person in proportion to his income.

While

this plan would bring relief to the lower classes, and their
enthusiastic support, it was sure to bring howls of pain from
the upper classes and professionals.
The junta was not the only group to be in a revolution
ary mood that day.

The Liga de Accion, a leftist political

group, published a manifesto demanding the dissolution of all
religious orders and a total reorganization of the Church in
Chile.

The manifesto called for the nationalization of the

clergy and restriction of their numbers to one clergyman for
every 50,000 inhabitants.

The League further proposed seizing

the Church lands and putting them to public use.
manifesto demanded Chile have a divorce law.

Lastly, the

While the ideas
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were in the spirit of the day, they were not likely to win
many converts to the radical causes from among the Conserva
tives .
While the junta was making revolutionary plans, its
former members were engaged m

the same task.

/

Davila and

Generals Puga and Arturo Merino, three of the five original
conspirators who had overthrown the government on June 4,
decided to have another go at it that day.
gan about seven in the evening.

Their revolt be 

They began by sending a

group of army officers into the Presidential Palace to arrest
Colonel Grove.

However, Grove Hid in a back room until they

left and then began making hasty calls for support.
It appeared that this latest coup would not be without a
clash of arms.

An insurgent infantry regiment occupied the

Ministry of War Building across the street from the President
ial Palace.

Grove's supporters in the Cavalry mounted machine

guns on top of the Palace.

Members of the Aviation School,

still loyal to Grove, bombed the infantry barracks and dropped
flares over the city.
Calle Moneda.

Some fire was exchanged across the

Both sides spent most of their time broad

casting pleas for public support over the radio.

Civilian

crowds massed and some Communists responded to Grove's pleas
for support b y attacking two churches near the battle scene,
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causing the Carabineros to be sent to quell the disturbance.
By 2:00 A.M., it was clear that the bulk of the military
was supporting the insurgents.
the other side.

Grove's troops went over to

General Merino, who had led the insurgent

troops, entered the Palace and was greeted by General Piuga,
still a member of the junta.

Merino assured him the insur

gents only wanted Grove and Matte.

Merino even offered Puga

the presidency of the new junta, but Puga declined it.
and Matte were arrested.

Grove

The insurgents had triumphed again,

for the second time in as many weeks.
Even as this new socialist revolution was in progress,
a change was clearly coming.

More than 500 alleged commun

ists were arrested, including their two most important lead
ers, Lafferte and Chamundez.

The army officers who attacked

the Palace in the early attempt to seize Grove explained to
reporters that they wished the "Maintenance of national
socialism, divested of Communists, and the expulsion from
the government of the fanatic and anti-patriotic elements."42
The Thermidorian Reaction had arrived.

This time the "Social

ist Republic" was going to be much less socialist and little
more republican.43
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June 17 - Friday

By early Friday it had become clear that a brief era had
ended.

The staffing of the new "Socialist Republic" and the

statements of its members brought the changes into focus.
General Puga moved from the junta to become Minister of
Defense, Grove's previous position.

Rolando Merino was dis

missed from the junta and not given any position in the new
government.

The third junta member, Matte, was in jail with

Grove awaiting transport into exile.
Provisional President.

Davila became the new

General Arturo Merino was returned to

his military command.
Early Friday the new government issued a manifesto explain
ing its goals and plans:
We wish to call a constitutional assembly,
which at the earliest possible date will draw up
a plan for a new political constitution, based on
the Socialist Organization of the State.
While the assembly fulfills its duties, the
new junta will uphold all statutes and resolutions
within the present constitution and existing laws
of the Republic unless they openly clash with the
progressive spirit which now inspires the new
regime.
The junta will give due respect to the inde
pendence of the courts of justice and commits it
self to recognize and respect international obli
gations .44
This manifesto was a statement of moderation in comparison
with the June 5 document.

The radical projects demanded
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earlier were either absent or explicitly denied in the new
program. 45^
General Merino explained the army's role in the new
regime, while criticizing Grove and Matte for allowing the
army to become involved in politics:
It (the army) rose because it could not remain
unmoved in the face of unruly actions by bold citi
zens who, forgetting patriotism, were exploiting
communist ideas that were an insult to the national
flag, despising the rights of other citizens of Chile.
We must start a period of social peace and we l
fare today, while the army units return to their
garrisons, delivering into the hands of civilian
patriots the pursuit and practical applications of
sound Socialist i d e a l s . 46
With General Merino emerging as the military strongman behind
the new junta, his statement accented two trends of the new
regime.

First was his reaction against the radicalism of the

previous regime which he characterized as "unpatriotic" and
its actions "communist".

Second, he downgraded class anta

gonism, which is the heart of all leftist ideologies.

The

"sound socialist ideals", if they conformed to Merino's
speech, were likely to be very mild.
Grove's anti-foreign capitalist stance was also altered
immediately by the regime.
Zanarta,

The new Finance Minister, Senator

spoke about the new regime's approaches to the

Cosach question.

He did not believe Cosach would be so great
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a problem under the new regime as it had been for Grove.

He

remarked that while the Cosach agreement could be altered, it
could not be violated.

Through a suitable alteration, he be 

lieved Chile could have her natural mineral rights protected,
but without having to assume control over the mines or plants.
His attitude made the possibility of nationalization and ex
propriation of the industry most unlikely.
that day,

He was able to say

"I firmly believe that the settlement we will make

will be equitable and acceptable to all parties concerned,
while it will maintain unimpaired the sources of national
wealth".47

With such an attitude,

international conciliation

was likely and any changes to Cosach would be minor.
On its first day the new "Socialist Republic" repudiated
the main points of its predecessor:
a new society, anti-imperialism,

class struggle to create

anti-capitalism and radical

change to reshape the state and its functions.

Davila's new

government proclaimed its belief in socialism throughout its
three-month life, but, from the first morning onward, it was
evident that this time it was state socialism, not the
"socialist revolution".

The new junta was another reformist

regime, but the revolution was over.

The legend of the real

"twelve day Socialist Republic" was born before the institu
tion bearing its name even died.

Interpretations
and
Viewpoints
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The Socialist Legend

The Socialists found themselves in a strange position,
following the June 16 counter-revolution. A "Socialist
Revolution" had overthrown the government and attempted a
radical transformation of the country.
Socialist Party was even formed.

All this before the

When the Party was esta

blished in 1933, it inherited the legacy of that revolution
and a "Republic" which had failed in almost every important
venture it had attempted.

Despite its failure, the heritage

of the "Republic" was a valuable asset as a rallying point
for socialist organization.

The "Republic's" programs had

pointed the direction for the ensuing socialist policy, in
the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist fields, to follow.
The noted interpreter of social revolutions, Regis
Debray, has presented the current evolution Grove legend in
his Conversations w ith A l lende.

Debray is one of the most

influential radical philosophers on Latin America today.

He

first gained recognition for his wor'ks on the Cuban Revolu
tion and the new revolutionary strategy.

By the time of his

capture in Bolivia, while fighting with Che Guevara, he had
attained the acme of the writer-revolutionary.

As a friend

of President Allende, his interpretation of Chilean revolu
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tionary history has considerable force and impressive credi
bility.

His version of the "Socialist Republic" is considered

history in many quarters.
The capitulation to imperialism and the politi
cal repression of the Ibanez dictatorship (1931) fol
lowed by the class rule of Montero (1932), had left
behind a wave of social discontent expressed in
strikes and other political actions by embryonic
workers' organizations and left-wing political parties.
Tenacious political work by a number of social
ist groups, combined with the discontent of the masses
and the injustices committed by those in power,
brought victory to a revolutionary movement led by
Colonel Marmaduke Grove (military leader) and Eugenio
Matte (civilian leader). On 4 June 1932 President
Montero was ousted and a socialist government was
established.
With a 150 point programme and under the slogan
"Bread, a Roof and Shelter" the new government embarked
on a series of concrete measures in favor of the dis
possessed.
Viewed today these measures appear extra
ordinarily ingenuous and naive - suspension of evic
tions of tenants, the return of objects pledged to
the Popular Credit Bank, the granting of popular
credits to small traders, etc. - but they undoubtedly
provoked the immediate anger of the reactionary right.
Moreover, the new government was clearly anti-imper
ialist: its economic programme stated that ...'all
heavy industry extracting primary products and a
large part of the public services are in the hands of
foreign enterprises.
Our privileged classes have
lived in the lap of luxury and comfort provided by
foreign capitalism, in exchange for our natural wealth
and the misery of the people'.
The programme of the revolutionaries did not
attempt either the socialization of the means of pro
duction or the confiscation of great fortunes.
More
over, the government did not rely decisively on the
masses to carry through its programme.
It was there
fore overthrown after twelve days by a coup d'etat
supported by the national bourgeoisie and imperialism.
But there is no doubt that, despite its short duration,
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the Revolutionary Junta was an inspiration for the
working class; and it united behind it five small
socialist movements which fused the following year
to found the Socialist Party.^
No one has remained more closely identified with the
Grove legend than the present President of Chile, Salvador
Allende.

Allende's long association with the Socialists and

widespread campaigning on that legacy have done much to popu
larize Grove's reputation.
President Allende discussed the “Socialist Republic"
with Debray and commented on that portion of the legacy which
is viewed as most significant by contemporary leftists; the
emergence of mass political consciousness and the development
of the Socialist Party.

"The Socialist Party has a tradition

of anti-imperialism which is bound up in history with the
process known in this country as the 'Socialist Revolution'
which began 4 June 1932.

Although it was only of short dura

tion, this process had a profound influence on vanguard
t h o u g h t .

Allende was one of those whose thoughts were

influenced by the "Republic".
In April,

1933, following the fall of Grove's government,

the Socialist Party was founded.

The legacy of the "Republic"

and its former members were the dominant influences.

Allende

can well make his claims as to the origin of the Socialist
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Party for, as he said to Debray,

"I didn't join the Social

ist Party, Regis - I am a founder, one of the founders of
the Socialist Party".
Marmaduke Grove.^

Another of those founders was

As a Socialist participant in the Popular

Front government under Cerda and as the leader who eventually
brought the Socialist Party to power in 1970, Allende's view
of the evolution of the party and its ideological origins is
often considered the most knowledgable and correct.
Allende's connections with Grove and the "Republic" were
hardly ephemeral or coincidental.

He was active enough as a

student to be arrested five times following Grove's fall.
His relationship to that government was personal as well as
political.
prison

"Other members of my family were also put into

[following the "Republic's" fall] including my brother-

in-law, Marmaduke Grove's brother . . .
had close ties with Grove.

As you can see, we

Allende continued hds political

association with Grove, though often critical of his tactics,
throughout the next decade until finally ousting Grove from
the Party leadership in 1943.6
appears undeniable.

Grove's influence on Allende

Allende's interpretation of the

"Republic's" role in Chilean history remains unchallenged,
knowledgable and political.
Richard Feinberg's observations,

The Triumph of Allende,
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on the 1970 presidential election, presented the popular view
of the Grove government.

"Unfortunately for the well-

intentioned (jj'rove, he was deposed after twelve glorious days
(11 should have armed the peo pl e 1, he said later). . . .
Out of the ashes of 'Manna's'

efforts was created, in the

following year, the Socialist Party of Chile, of which
Salvador Allende was the f o u n d e r . F e i n b e r g can be excused
for relating this view as history.

He was a Peace Corps

agronomist working in Chile during the election.

It is

testimony to the strength of the legend, even among the
agrarian sector, that this is the version he was told.
The essence of the Socialist interpretation of the
"Socialist Republic" rests on four points.

First: Grove led

a socialist revolution rising out of the discontent of the
oppressed masses.

Second: The "Republic" was essentially

anti-imperialist and pro-working class in orientation.

Third:

The causes of the "Republic's" fall were due to its program
not being radical enough and not allowing sufficient mass
participation to withstand the reaction of the bourgeoisie
and foreign capitalists.

Fourth: The "Republic11 provided the

ideological and organizational groundwork for its program's
eventual triumph under Allende.
The legacy of the "Republic" was a mixed blessing for
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the Socialists.

Without the heritage,

the Socialist leaders

would not have had the moral authority among the leftists
which was necessary to forge the many splinter groups into a
coherent party.

On the other hand, a careful study of the

"Republic" would show a rather hollow inheritance.

While its

proclamations had sounded good, its actions had inevitably
failed to match its decrees, and had often directly contra
dicted its espoused intentions.

As a legend the "Republic"

was a revered rallying point for the new Socialist Party.
history,

As

it could become an albatross of failures around their

necks, having to be explained away to other leftists.

The Communist Interpretation

If any doubt existed in the minds of the Left that the
"Socialist Republic" was dead by mid-June,

the next issue of

the "Communist International" should have laid it to rest.
In the summary article,

"June Events in Chile", the "Inter

national” presented a detailed analysis of past history.
haps more than any other,
it represented,
government.

Per

this article, and the official view

colored the ensuing reputation of the Grove

Just as Marx had published his Civil War In

France giving the official view a mere two days after the
fall of the Commune, once again the Communists rushed to the
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presses, published first and claimed the official interpreta
tion for their own.
The Communist analysis was thorough and detailed, if
strewn with inaccuracies.

Their analysis began from the

premise that a revolutionary mass had been waiting for the
opportunity to make the inevitable revolution.

In the Commun

ist view, it could not have been a military coup, a revolu
tion from the top.

The revolution had to spring from the

wells of proletarian discontent.

"The fundamental and most

important feature of the latest events

(June 1932) is the

deep revolutionary mass movement, particularly of the workers
and urban petty bourgeoisie, which did not, however, have a
revolutionary leadership and was therefore utilized by the
opposing cliques of the ruling c l a s s e s . T h e

leaders were

not the makers of the revolution but were, instead,
manipulators of its defeat.

the inept

Davila was seen as representing

the bourgeoisie and the landed oligarchy.

Grove was seen in

a better light as being the leader of the petty bourgeois
elements.

The differences in the classes of the leaders

caused the "Republic" to have two distinct phases.
/

The Davila-Grove phase was seen as all thunder and little
lightning.

Worse yet, with what little lightning there was,

its bolts were often aimed toward the revolution's friends
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and not the enemies so thunderously enumerated.
Seeking to utilize the support of the masses . . .
the Davila-Grove government . . . engaged in extensive
anti-imperialist and even anti-capitalist social
demagogy, and proclaimed the establishment of a
"Socialist Republic of Chile".
This demagogy alarmed
even a large section of the imperialist press at
first . . . A few days later it had become sufficient
ly clear that Davila had no intention of going beyond
vague promises and demagogic attacks against imperial
ism.
The government of the "Socialist Republic of
Chile" not only repudiated all charges of "bolshevism",
"communism" and its intention to repeat the "Russian
experience", but announced its intention to mercilessly
suppress the Communist Party of Chile.
The imperialist
press regained its peace of mind - the introduction of
socialism was in safe hands.^
Under Davila,

the "International" believed the "Republic"

bordered on outright treason to the cause it espoused.
If that indictment was not enough, the Communists listed
the individual failures of the period.

The failure to dissolve

Cosach was probably the most grievous sin.

That could have

been a strong blow against international imperialism.

The old

communist charge hurled against the Communards arose again.

A

revolution must nationalize the banks, not in decrees as
/
.
Davila did, but m

.
practice.

.
To strike at the banks is an

essential double-edged revolutionary blow; it gives the
revolution funds to carry on and, it hits at the very heart of
the capitalist power, destroying its ability to continue.
Other failures, not seizing foreign currency, not sufficiently
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aiding the unemployed or disbanding religious orders, were
also criticized in turn.

But these were small errors, not

tactical blunders as the banks and Cosach were.

No true

revolutionary would have allowed such imperialist institutions
to elude his grasp.

u

The Grove-Matte period fared somewhat better under the
Communist review:

These leaders won qualified praise for

their decision to. confiscate foreign currency,, for appointing
Nunez as Superintendent of Nitrate Mines with orders to dis
mantle Cosach, as well as for seizing excess gold from private
sources.

The moves to control food prices and feed the un

employed were seen as particularly laudable.
But Grove and Matte did not rate a clean slate from the
''International" critics either.

Certainly they were still in

part responsible for the failures of the first phase, although
their performance improved after getting more leeway by dump
ing Davila.

Both their greatest failure and greatest signifi

cance came in the field of political theory.

Their failure

was their inability to establish any clear political program
or delineate a course of action.

This incapacitated their

efforts to form any mass organization which could have sup
ported the regime and carried through its programs.
The Communists viewed the significance of the Grove-Matte

56

the Party, or notice that the Party had been upstaged by a
genuinely revolutionary group.

As a legend,

the "Republic1'

was obscure and harmless to the Communists; as history it
could come back to haunt the Party in its Latin American
ventures.
To both of the major groups of the Left, Communists and
Socialists,

the "Republic" was best preserved as legend, not

as written history.

For their own sectarian interests, they

chose to preserve and use the legend.

The best explanation

might have been to view the "Republic" as a military coup with
socialist policies, but this would never fit either of their
needs.

Perhaps that is what Norton saw, when viewing the

week-old "Republic", he wrote,

"A socialism which rides into

power on a military dictatorship will be neither dangerous
to its opponents nor effective to its friends

A Foreign Perspective

The British Embassy saw the "revolution" in an entirely
different light than the Left did.

In a confidential letter

to the Cabinet, Charge/ d 'Affaires Thompson analyzed the
"revolution's" causes and course.

His point of departure was

radically different from the Left's premise.

The British saw

the uprising as a personalistic revolt by Grove against being
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relieved of his command by a weak President Montero.
said the coup,

"...

needn't have been.

Thompson

One well-led and

well-disciplined machine-gun company of a British line regi
ment could have put an end to the entire movement".-1'4

Having

succeeded in cowing the weak President into allowing him to
assume power, Grove then set up a military

dictatorship.^

While a military dictatorship, in and of itself, did not
particularly bother the British,

this regime greatly upset them

as they believed it to be primarily incompetent, and secondari
ly, favoring radicalism.
opinion in Chile " . . .

Thompson reported that responsible
believed that it would scarcely have

been possible to collect together a more irresponsible collec
tion of men . . ."16 than Grove's cabinet.

While Thompson

had no faith in the ability of the regime to effect its pro
gram, he felt extremely uneasy about the prospects of what
these irresponsible radicals might attempt.1^
With the exit of Davila and Arturo Merino from the govern
ment things took a decided turn for the worse.
these personnel changes, Thompson commented,
we are dealing with a virtual dictator

In reporting

11In other words

(Grove) who has violent

views and whom I firmly believe is not quite responsible for
his actions".18

At this point, began a very definite and

somewhat uncontrolled movement toward communism.

Fanned on
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by the radical propaganda and atmosphere,

the country rapidly

drfited to the point of either becoming communist or having
another military revolt to restore the government to firm and
competent h a n d s . T h e

counter-coup came and the " . . .

re

sult of the counter-revolution is welcomed by all responsible
opinion here as having saved us from a communistic regime

(in

retrospect it seems clear the situation on June 15 and 16 was
about as bad as it could b e ) ."20
Thompson believed that the counter-coup was partially the
result of the sound British policy.

The pressures caused by

the warnings from Parliament and the press and the dispatch
ing of a warship formed part of the causes which moved the
military to revolt.
I have heard from several sources that the move
ments of H.M.S. Durban formed the subject of discus
sion at various meetings of military officers which
preceeded the counter-revolution of the 16th June,
and also that they caused no small stir in naval
circles.
The news appears to have come as a severe
blow to the pride of the armed forces and may well
have proved one of the factors which determined them
to act against Grove.21
Despite this reprieve from communism, Thompson still felt the
future was rather bleak as the passions of the masses,

loosed

by Grove and Matte, would prove difficult to control and
their radicalism, once awakened, might reappear in the future.22
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A Historical Analysis

To render an accurate evaluation of the legend of the
"Socialist Republic" one must inspect each of its four main
contentions.

First,

that Grove led a socialist revolution

arising out of the discontent of the oppressed masses.

The

analysis of both the Socialist and Communist Parties support
this contention.

No other assertion of the legend rests on

so little evidence.

It is true that the masses, and the

country as a whole, were dissatisfied with the state of af
fairs in Chile during the early 1930's.

President Ibanez had

been forced into resigning in 1931 by popular strikes, parti
cularly among the professions.

The people were not particu

larly pleased with his successor's, President Montero's,
attempts to alleviate the effects of the world depression on
Chile either.

However,

did not, revolt.
coup.

the people were not prepared to, and

The "Socialist Revolution" was a military

Of its five main leaders, only Matte had any real and

tangible connections with the masses.

At no time during the

day-long revolt of June 4 did the people come out and aid in
the overthrow of the government.

Their only revolutionary

activity in aid of the coup was withholding support from
either side.

The "Socialist Revolution" was a revolution
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from the top, made by a group of well-intentioned men, joined
together by the common desire to attempt to relieve Chile's
problems by socialist methods.
Second, the legend contends that the "Republic" was es
sentially anti-imperialistic and pro-working class in orient
ation.

There is little doubt that the "Republic" favored the

lower classes.

From its initial manifesto until its fall,

most of its decrees were for reforms in their favor.

These

reforms were the essence of its claim to being socialist.
anti-imperialist claim is harder to accept.

The

While the mani

festo and many decrees did attack foreign capitalists, the
government took no action on this front.

Each program

announced in that direction was rescinded almost immediately.
The only real threat to the capitalists came in the second
week when Grove appointed Nunez to resolve the nitrate prob
lem.

Perhaps with more time the anti-imperialist intentions

could have become reality.

While the "Republic" did aid the

workers, it never effectively challenged the imperialists.
Third, the legend alleges that the causes of the "Repub
lic's" downfall were due to its program not being radical
enough and not allowing sufficient mass participation to
withstand the reaction of the bourgeoisie and foreign capi
talists.

While this explains the "Republic's" demise in
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proper revolutionary fashion, it hardly does justice to the
known facts.

The main cause of Grove's fall was that he had

become the leader of a military coup which no longer had the
support of the military.

After purging Davila and Arturo

Merino, and stripping Puga of any real power, Grove had alien
ated his main pillars of support.

Coupled with the military's

fear of communism and foreign intervention, his position b e 
came untenable.
The upper classes never really made any serious attempt
to crush the "Republic".
smash the revolution.

Neither did the threat from abroad

The United States and Britian were

clearly worried about their investments.

They could be ex

pected to make serious demands or even impose sanctions on
Chile if their holdings were nationalized.

However,

the one

lone warship sent by Britian toward Chile was neither a strong
enough nor real enough threat to topple the government.
If anything,

the "Republic11 was too radical too quickly.

The military saw the radicalism as moving toward communism.
They joined behind the moderate socialist faction led by
Davila before the Grove faction had time to build any real
mass base of support.

There were some indications that the

masses had begun to move toward Grove's positions.

The Com

munists replying to his pleas for support during the June 16
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coup and the railway workers striking to protest his ouster,
pointed out that with more time he might have built an altern
ate power base to replace the military.

Grove's mistake was

/

not in purging Davila and the power he represented, but in
doing it too soon and leaving himself nowhere to turn for
support.
To have armed the workers, as they demanded, for a
Commune-style defense would have been suicidal.

There was no

reason to believe the workers would have defended the govern
ment, regardless of how radical it was.

Had the workers

attempted to do so, they surely would have been crushed by
the military.

For the "Republic" to have been more radical,

without a revolutionary mass to sustain it, would only have
shortened its existence even further.
Finally,

the legend contends that the "Republic" pro

vided the ideological and organizational groundwork for its
program's eventual triumph.
strength.

Herein lies the legend's

The "Republic" provided the Socialists with three

important guides.

First,

the Socialists renounced any inten

tion of attempting the revolution by coup again.

Rather they

would build an electoral coalition to seize power within the
system.

Given Chile's legalistic political tradition this

was the wisest method of obtaining and maintaining power.
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Second,

the "Republic's" fall pointed out the need for con

solidation and organization of the Left.

Within a year this

was accomplished, with the founding of a coalition Socialist
Party of Chile.

This new party provided the Socialists and

the whole Left with a base of support upon which to work.
Lastly,

the "Republic" provided a rallying point to attract

converts.

It stood as a real and visible example of an

alternate direction in which the country could move.
presence in the political heritage,

By its

the legend of the "Social

ist Republic" provided the motivation to make itself a real
ity.

Appendixes

Ap p endix A
DECLARATION OP T H E REVOLUTIONARY JUNTA
TO T H E COUNTRY MADE AT 2.20 A.M., June
5>th, 1932.

Those elements of the people who hold advanced political
and economic doctrines can be certain that their basic
aspirations will be fully satisfied by the Socialist
Government of Chile, whose sole desire is to bring to the
unprotected classes the h e a l t h and well being to w hi c h they
have a legitimate right as the producers of the whole wealth
of the country.
The workers* organizations, whatever political theories
they may hold, have an exceptional opportunity for display
ing their loyal co-operation w i t h the w ork commenced by those
whose chief a im is the practical well being of the productive
forces of the country.
The different Governments which have succeeded one a n 
other In the past years hav e completely failed.

The liberal

doctrines and the specious adherence to legalistic forms
which inspired their administrative and political conduct,
cut t h e m off entirely f r o m their times and from reality.
Further they all lacked sufficient

strength with wh i c h to

combat the aggressive influence of foreign imperialism.
The proletariat, the productive classes and the whole
nation have borne the effects of a social and economic

regime w h i c h permits the exploitation of labour, unbridled
speculation and the sway of galling privileges.

The growing

disorganization of our national economy, the domination, b e 
coming daily more absolute,

of foreign interests,

created and

operated by plutocracy and oligarcy, the heedlessness and in
efficiency of the former Governments have continued to a c 
centuate in a tragic degree the misery of the people and the
approaching death of our national independence.
Yesterday, the heart felt desire for self-preservation,
which was growing in the public conscience, found the means
of becoming a reality through the assistance of the armed
forces.

The necessity of placing the organization of the

n a t i o n ’s economy upon foundations of justice and of giving
to the State a functional structure suited to the present com
plexity of its nature could now no longer be postponed.

For

this end, therefore, a radical change of regime was required.
The new Government will apply itself energetically to the
solution of the social, political and economic problems of
Chile.

Its action will not be checked by petty personal and

party considerations and it will keep aloof fro m any in
fluence which can we aken its moral force.

Its sole a i m will

be the realization of its fundamental plans:- the scientific
organization of the productive forces under the control of
the State, the establishment of social justice, and the a s 
surance to every Chilean of the right to live and to work.
We are attempting to lay the foundations of a society
better than the present one with i n the natural limits imposed

(m

by the resources of the country and its historical features.
To attain this end, we believe that the acti o n of the Gov
ernment must be inspired by socialist principles which re
flect the various needs and desires of the present time.
It is no longer possible to shut oneself up in the ivory
tower of the anachronistic theory of liberal individualism
and of the superstitious respect for laws w h i c h result solely
in the paralization of society and to use these fetiches as
a pretext for inaction.
The historical justification of any government rests upon
the action it takes in the interest of the masses.

We have

come to power with the object of carrying out a program of
spiritual and material renovation.

We wish to imbue every

national activity with a r h ythm of energy, youth,
and discipline.

efficiency

We will convert into facts not only our im

mediate aims, which we are publishing to-day, but also our
general plans for the socialization of the State, trusting,
as we do, in their beneficent results and possessing the
assurance that, in the o pinion of the country, t hey will find
sufficient moral support to prevent any reactionary force
f r o m harming or destroying them.
We do not believe that the spiritual reserves of Chile
are exhausted.

Everywhere there are brave men prepared for

constructive action.

If until yesterday these m e n found no
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public scope for their ideals, the time has now come when
they can take t he initiative.

We address ourselves to them

confident that they will be able to co-operate effectively
in the realization of the ideal which we of the present Gov
ernment keep before u s .
Credit must be controlled by the State for the benefit of
the masses in order to avoid the exploitation of the worker
by the capitalist

.

The Government will not permit the paralization of p r o 
ductive activities and therefore no concern, whether Chilean
or foreign, will be allowed to withdraw, on the pretext of
protecting the interest or profits of its capital, from the
fulfilment of the duty it possesses to contribute, by its
production,

to the solution of the economic problems of t h 6

country.
The Government recognizes its obligation to control In
ternal and external commerce, taking solely into considera
tion the interests of society.
Consequently,

In its dealings w ith foreign markets, it

will aim at freeing the administration of the country from
the yoke of international and national capitalism.
If it is found necessary, the Government will immediately
import on its own account, sugar, petroleum,
other essential articles.

petrol, and

In order that It may at once take control of internal com
merce, the Government will demand f r o m all national and
foreign concerns a declaration of their stocks of essential
articles, so that it may be in a position to guarantee to
the people their normal living requirements.
The Government recognizes as one of its fundamental duties
the assurance of the necessities of life to every individual
of society and for this end it will employ every means at
the disposal of the country.
The Government intends to make w o r k obligatory, so that
every man m a y possess the means wherewith to acquire hia
needs.
During the interval in which the economy of the country
is being so re-organized that the Government may be able to
carry out its obligation of providing work for all, the n e c 
essary steps will be taken to give food, clothes and lodging
to the people.
Under the control of the workers' organizations, the dis
tribution of food will now be efficiently carried out and
assistance will be rendered by the personnel,

transport and

equipment which the Army has at its disposal.
Until such time as the Government can fulfil its promise
to give a home to every individual,

it will guarantee a

shelter to those who to-d a y do not possess the means to pay
for one.
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The State recognizes that property has a social reason
for existence and that it must therefore be used in the in 
terests of the people as a whole.
In order to avoid the injustice created by the unequal
distribution of wealth,

the system of t a xa t i o n will be m o d i 

fied and large incomes will be heavily taxed.
While this modification is being carried out, a progres
sively Increasing capital levy will be imposed on all f o r 
tunes of more than one million pesos.
A n economic executive committee will take control of the
processes of production and distribution In order to adjust
t hem to the needs of the masses.
The committee will supervise the productive enterprises
of the State which will be formed with the object of restor
ing our capacity of payment for imported articles by creat
ing new markets for our exports.
Public education will be re-organized u p o n a basis of
functional, technical and administrative independence.

A p p endix B
T H I R T Y POINTS OF THE JUNTA' S IMMEDIATE PROGRAMME.

1.

Assumption of the whole of the Public Authority by the

Executive Council and its Ministry.
2.

Dissolution of the National Congress.

3.

Organisation of the control of food stuffs, with requis

ition (requisamiento ) and other measures of the kind that
may be required to assure "el abaratam iento de la poblacion"
- (presumably means reduction of cost of living).
4.

Heavy t a x on all big fortunes, without exception, to ob

tain a sum not less tha n $500,000,000 pesos.

(Rate of e x 

change not stated).
5.

Increase of complementary tax on incomes over $36 ,000

per annum, and an additional t a x on Chileans resident
abroad.

6.

Expropriation of deposits in foreign money and gold,

paying for t h e m in currency at 6d to the peso.
7.

Immediate use of the fiscal farms, of those in debt to

credit institutions and of those that are unproductive for
lack of exploitation, for colonisation w ith unemployed,
planted with technical assistance of the State.

im

Army t r a n s 

port to be used in the installation of the colonists.

8.

Expropriation of the land taken over by the State at a

just valuation and up to the amount of the respective

mortgage obligation.
9.

Suspension of the eviction of small renters who have

fallen behind in their payments and immediate occupation of
empty houses.

The Army will assist in the work.

10. Amnesty for the seamen condemned for the Incidents of
Coquimbo and Talcahuano and of others under trial or sen
tenced for political offences, the law relating to the In 
terior security of the State being derogated.
11. Immediate reopening of the nitrate of i cinas using the
Shanks process and other auxiliaries tending to low cost of
product i on.
12. Liquidation or immediate reorganisation of the Cosach.
13. State monopoly of gold and exploitation to produce 30
kilos a day.
1 4 . Monopoly of Iodine, t h e n of petroleum, matches, tobacco,
alcohol and sugar.
15. Organisation of production till dumping of nitrate and
iodine is practicable.

16 . State monopoly of foreign trade.
17. Progressive and continuous socialisation of credit.
18. Organisation of a State "Casa de Comercio” annexed to
the railways for the purchase and sale of articles of prime
necessity

(frutos del pais).

19. Reorganisation of the diplomatic and consular service to
adapt it to the requirements

of foreign t r a d e .

20. Celebration of "Indo-American" treaties.

21. Revision of salaries, pensions and retiring allowances
reorganising the staff of the public and municipal employees,
suppressing useless departments and posts.

$ 36,000 pesos

per annum to be the maximum salary for fiscal,

semi-fiscal

and municipal services.
22. Reorganisation, selection and reduction of the armed
forces.
23. Improvement

and extension of primary education.

21).. Recognition

of the Soviet government and revision of the

contracts of foreign companies that amount to monopolies.
2^. Prohibition to import sumptuary articles,

silks, cars,

perfumes, and whatever may be replaced by national industry.

2 6 . Suppression of t a x on Argentine cattle, wheat and raw
materials for national industries elaborating food stuffs.
27. Study of the organisation of a constituent assembly on a
functional basis to dictate the new Fundamental Constitution
of the State.
28. Creation of a Ministry of National Health, establishing
unity of action

in the sanitary services of the country.

29. Reorganisation

of the Administration of Justice.

30. Tribunal de Sancion Nacional.

(The creation of a Court

for the punishment of offenders against the State.)
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belonging to persons who are indebted to credit institutions
and of those which are unproductive because of lack of exploi
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direction of the state.
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The immediate liquidation or reorganization of Cosach.
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tobacco, alcohol and sugar.
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annexed to the railways for the purchase and sale of the
articles of prime necessity.
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